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ANTITRUST LAW-CLAYTON ACT-OFFENSIVE USE OF THE PASS-ON
THEORY-The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
pass-on theory may not be used offensively by an indirect purchaser
against an alleged antitrust violator to prove that the indirect pur-
chaser has been injured within the meaning of section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Petitioners are manufacturers of concrete block used in building
construction in the Greater Chicago area.1 The concrete block is
purchased directly from petitioners by masonry contractors, who
submit bids to general contractors for the masonry portions of con-
struction projects. The general contractors in turn submit bids on
an entire building project to customers such as the respondents in
this case, the State of Illinois, and various local governmental enti-
ties in the Greater Chicago area, including counties, municipalities,
housing authorities, and school districts.'
An antitrust treble-damage action was brought by the respon-
dents under section 4 of the Clayton Act,3 charging that the petition-
ers had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act4 by conspiring to fix
the price of concrete block,' allegedly resulting in overcharges of an
1. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977). In 1973, the United States had
filed a criminal indictment against the same block manufacturers, charging that they had
violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to fix the price of concrete block. A plea of
nolo contendere was accepted in the criminal case. United States v. Ampress Brick Co., No.
73 CR 312 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 1973).
2. 431 U.S. at 726. Because the respondents received the concrete block only after it had
already passed through two separate levels in the chain of distribution, they were indirect
purchasers. The majority of the building project contracts were awarded pursuant to competi-
tive bidding based on plans and specifications setting forth the amount and type of concrete
block required for each project. The bids from the general contractors to their customers
included the cost of the concrete block purchased from the manufacturer or masonry contrac-
tor. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., Inc., 536 F.2d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
3. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides: "Any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor. . . without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, 'and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee."
4. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), provides in pertinent part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . .. .
5. Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose of fixing prices
in interstate or foreign commerce has been held to be a per se restraint of trade. United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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amount in excess of three million dollars.' Petitioner manufacturers
moved for summary judgment against all respondents who did not
purchase the concrete block directly from petitioners, contending
that as a matter of law only direct purchasers could sue for the
alleged overcharge.' The district court granted petitioners' motion,
holding that indirect purchasers such as respondents incurred inju-
ries too remote and inconsequential to provide standing to sue the
alleged antitrust violators.' The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that indirect purchasers could recover treble dam-
ages for an illegal overcharge if they were able to prove that the
overcharge, or some part of it, was passed on to them through the
different levels in the distribution chain.9 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari" to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals"
on whether the restrictions placed on the defensive use of the pass-
on theory 2 by Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.3
should be equally applied to the offensive use of the pass-on
theory.
6. 431 U.S. at 727. Because of the treble-damage provision contained in § 4 of the Clayton
Act, respondents were actually seeking damages in excess of nine million dollars.
7. Id.
8. Illinois v. Ampresa Brick Co., Inc., 67 F.R.D. 461, 466-68 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536
F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
9. 536 F.2d at 1167.
10. 429 U.S. 938 (1976).
11. Compare Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187
(3d Cir. 1971), aff'g per curiam Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (indirect purchasers' suit alleging that illegal
overcharges by manufacturers of plumbing fixtures had been passed on to them was dismissed
since plaintiffs did not fit the cost-plus exception to Hanover Shoe) with In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973) (ultimate consumers had standing to bring an
action to recover on the theory that unlawful prices charged to consumers' contractors pur-
suant to suppliers' conspiracy to fix prices were passed on to consumers by contractors), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.
1971) (passing-on theory could be employed where it was not used as a defense and where
wholesalers and retailers sold, in virtually all cases, at cost plus set percentage mark-up), cert.
denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971); and Illinois v.
Ampress Brick Co., Inc., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
12. For a discussion of the history and meaning of the pass-on theory; see L. SUIVAN,
ANTrrRusT § 252 (1977).
13. 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (the Court rejected as a matter of law, except in very limited
circumstances, the defensive use of the pass-on theory to defeat a direct purchaser's right to
recovery in an antitrust suit).
14. 431 U.S. at 728.
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THE DECISION OF THE COURT
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed." Relying upon the
rationale in Hanover Shoe," Justice White, speaking for the major-
ity, held that the pass-on theory may not be used offensively by an
indirect purchaser against an alleged antitrust violator. The Court
stated that it reached this result in two steps. 7 First, it concluded
that any rule adopted to govern the use of the pass-on theory in
antitrust treble-damage actions had to apply equally to both sides.
The Court stated that multiple liability would be a serious problem
if it permitted the offensive but not the defensive use of pass-on in
antitrust treble-damage actions, reasoning that an unqualified rec-
ognition of offensive passing-on could result in six-fold or more dam-
ages for a single violation." The Court rejected various procedural
devices suggested as possible solutions viewing them as inadequate
to reduce this risk of duplicative recoveries," and the Court feared
that even if some procedural device could be used to bring all poten-
tial plaintiffs together in a single action, "the difficulties likely to
be encountered in the management of [such] a class action""
would make the procedure equally inadequate.2' In addition, the
Court reasoned that the complexity of proof necessary to establish
a pass-on of an overcharge, the principal concern in Hanover Shoe,
would be as great when the plaintiffs introduced the same evidence
to prove that the overcharge was passed on to them.22 Furthermore,
the Court stated that it understood Hanover Shoe to rest on the
presumption that the antitrust laws will be more effectively en-
forced by permitting only the direct purchaser to recover for an
illegal overcharge than "by allowing every plaintiff potentially af-
fected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could show
15. Id. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Stewart joined. Justice Brennan filed a dissent-
ing opinion, in which Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Blackmun filed
an additional dissent.
16. See notes 35-42 and accompanying text infra.
17. 431 U.S. a.t 728.
18. Id. at 730. See Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The
Fallacy of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 649 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Handler & Blechman].
19. 431 U.S. at 731 n.11.
20. Fn. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
21. 431 U.S. at 731 n.11.
22. Id. at 732.
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was absorbed by it."' The Court concluded that not allowing the
offensive use of the pass-on theory was consistent with this pre-
sumption.
In its second step, the Court declined to abandon the construction
given section 4 in Hanover Shoe 2 absent a clear showing that the
effectiveness of the antitrust treble-damage action could be main-
tained without adopting a rule which would only allow a direct
purchaser to recover for an illegal overcharge. In reaching this re-
sult, the Court alluded to considerations of stare decisis2 5 and to
difficulties in apportioning the recovery among all of the potential
plaintiffs which would "add whole new dimensions of complexity to
treble-damage suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness. 26
Justice Brennan dissented, rejecting the majority's construction
of section 4 of the Clayton Act.Y He asserted that the broad objec-
tives served by section 4-to compensate persons injured by viola-
tions of the antitrust laws and to deter future violations-would be
greatly undermined by the Court's holding that section 4 afforded
a remedy only to direct purchasers and not to indirect purchasers.
Indeed, Brennan argued, when Congress recently enacted the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,25 it acted on the
assumption that section 4 gave a cause of action to both direct and
indirect purchasers."2 Furthermore, difficulties in apportioning
damages between direct and indirect purchasers were not compel-
ling reasons, as far as Brennan was concerned, for denying indirect
23. Id. at 735.
24. In Hanover Shoe, the Court construed § 4 of the Clayton Act to include the direct
purchaser in the distribution chain as the party "injured in his business or property." 392
U.S. at 488-89.
25. In decisions involving statutory construction, the principle of stare decisis weighs
heavily because Congress has the power to change the court's interpretation of its legislation.
431 U.S. at 736.
26. Id. at 737.
27. Id. at 748 (dissenting opinion).
28. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). This Act authorizes state attorneys general
to sue parens patriae to recover damages on behalf of citizens of their various states against
antitrust violators.
29. See note 77 and accompanying text infra. Actually, this legislative enactment allowing
state attorneys general to sue parens patriae could be read as an attempt by Congress to show
its dissatisfaction with the Hanover Shoe result, thereby rebutting the majority's stare decisis
argument.
Justice White did not believe that Congress intended to alter the Court's construction of §
4 of the Clayton Act when it enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act.
Instead, he stated that it simply created the new procedural device, parens patriae, to enforce
existing rights of recovery under § 4. 431 U.S. at 733 n.14.
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purchasers their day in court.ss From the deterrence standpoint,
Brennan believed that antitrust violators are equally deterred
whether they paid damages to direct or indirect purchasers. Finally,
Brennan concluded that the risk of multiple liability should not bar
all recoveries by indirect purchasers given the procedural devices 1
available to the district court to eliminate this danger in most in-
stances.2
THE HANOVER SHOE RATIONALE
The Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe expressly rejected as a mat-
ter of law, except in very limited circumstances,3 the defensive use
of the pass-on theory to defeat a direct purchaser's right to recovery
in an antitrust suit." In reaching this result, the Court employed
30. Id. at 759-60 (dissenting opinion). Brennan conceded, however, that despite the broad
language of § 4 there is a point beyond which the antitrust violator should not be held liable.
In determining who can sue, Brennan stated that the courts have balanced the deterrent and
compensatory values of private enforcement against the dangers of excessive litigation and
multiple liability and have come up with two standing tests-the "direct injury" test and
the "target area" test. The direct injury test focuses on whether the plaintiffs contractual
relations with the violator are of such a nature as to insure that the plaintiff has suffered
direct injury, whereas the target area test focuses on whether the plaintiff is within the
foreseeable zone of harm created by the defendant's violation. Brennan concluded that "if
the broad language of § 4 means anything, surely it must render the defendant liable to those
within the defendant's chain of distribution." Id. For a detailed discussion of the two standing
tests, see Comment, Mangano and Ultimate Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover
Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 394, 396-404 [hereinafter cited as Misuse of Hanover Doctrine].
But see McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover
Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Prrr. L. Ray. 177, 179-83 (1971) (author asserts
that the tests thus far developed by the courts are inadequate to determine whether indirect
purchasers should be allowed to recover) [hereinafter cited as McGuire].
31. See notes 55-72 and accompanying text infra.
32. Justice Blackmun, separately dissenting, believed that the majority's decision was
"consistent" with its prior application of the pass-on theory, but felt it was "a wooden
approach . . . entirely inadequate when considered in the light of the objectives of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts." Blackmun expressed the opinion that Congress would now be
forced to enact another statute to achieve these objectives. 431 U.S. at 765 (dissenting opin-
ion).
33. The Court cited a "pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract" as an example of when a pass-
on defense might be permitted. The existence of such a contract makes it easy to prove that
the overcharged buyer has not been damaged by the illegal overcharge. 392 U.S. at 494.
34. Hanover Shoe was a private antitrust treble-damage action instituted by a shoe man-
ufacturer against a manufacturer of shoe machinery pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act.
Hanover claimed that United's policy of only leasing machines and refusing to sell them had
increased the cost of Hanover's manufacturing operations, and it sought damages measured
by the amount of the alleged overcharge. United, which in an earlier civil action brought by
the United States had been found to have monopolized the shoe machinery market, United
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three grounds for support.1 The first basis rested on the theory
expressed in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta31 and
Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 7 that a viola-
tion is complete at the time of the initial injury. As a general rule,
a plaintiff in a private treble-damage action under section 4 of the
Clayton Act must establish not only a violation, but also that he was
"injured in his business or property" by the violation., The plaintiff
must show such "injury" through proof of actual pecuniary loss. The
Court in Hanover Shoe, however, adopted an exception to this gen-
eral rule when an action is brought by direct purchasers against an
antitrust violator in order to recover for alleged illegal overcharges.
In such cases, the Court held the "injury" requirement under sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act is satisfied merely by proof of the illegal
overcharge, regardless of any subsequent attempts by the injured
party to mitigate the injury.39 The Court concluded, therefore, that
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347
U.S. 521 (1954), contended that Hanover was not injured within the meaning of § 4 because
it had passed on any overcharge to its own customers by increasing the prices at which it sold
its shoes. 392 U.S. at 487-88.
35. For a thorough and interesting analysis of the three rationales of Hanover Shoe, see
Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123 U. PA.
L. Rav. 976, 979-84 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Offensive Use of Passing-On]; Note, The
Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-On Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. Rav.
98, 101-06 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Effect of Hanover Shoe].
36. 203 U.S. 390 (1906). The city of Atlanta sued the defendants for treble damages for
overcharges on the city's purchases of pipe for its waterworks system. The Court affirmed a
judgment in favor of the city for an amount measured by the difference between the price
actually paid and what the price would have been had the sellers not combined. The Court
reasoned that the city "was injured in its property, at least, if not in its business of furnishing
water, by being led to pay more than the worth of the pipe." Id. at 396.
37. 245 U.S. 531 (1918). Shippers brought an action for reparations against a railroad
claiming that the railroad had charged unreasonable rates. The railroad argued that the
shippers had passed on to their customers any excess over the reasonable rate. In response to
the railroad's reply, the Court stated that "It]he general tendency of the law, in regard to
damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step. . . . Their claim accrued at once in the
theory of the law and it does not inquire into later events. . . ." Id. at 533.
38. See Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-On Defense: The Hanover
Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BuLL. 1183, 1184-91 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Pollock].
39. 392 U.S. at 489. As the Court reasoned in Hanover Shoe:
If in the face of the overcharge the buyer does nothing and absorbs the loss, he is
entitled to treble damages . . . . It is also clear that if the buyer, responding to the
illegal price, 'Maintains his own price but takes steps to increase his volume or to
decrease other costs, his right to damages is not destroyed . . . . We hold that the
buyer is equally entitled to damages if he raises the price for his own product. As long
as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer more than
Vol. 16: 841
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since the violation is complete at the time of the initial injury,
consideration of the pass-on defense would be improper.
The second basis of the Hanover Shoe decision was the Court's
concern with the economic uncertainties and complexities involved
in proving the pass-on of increased costs." The Court believed that
even if it could determine the amount of the passed-on overcharge,
frequent use of this defense would result in a heavy burden on the
judicial system itself. The Court feared that already complex anti-
trust litigation would be so massive and convoluted as to make the
task almost "insurmountable.""
The third rationale underlying the Hanover Shoe decision was the
need to preserve the effective private enforcement of the antitrust
laws."2 The real danger foreseen by the Court was that if the direct
purchaser were denied the right to bring such an action, the task of
enforcing the antitrust laws would fall upon the party least likely
to bring suit-the indirect purchaser. Therefore, unless the first
purchaser were allowed to recover even what could amount to a
windfall gain, the antitrust violator might be able to escape liability
altogether.
HANOVER SHOE DOES NOT COMPEL THE RESULT IN ILLuNOIs BRICK
In examining the applicability of Hanover Shoe's three rationales
to the offensive passing-on theory asserted in Illinois Brick, the
inescapable conclusion is that Hanover Shoe should not prohibit it.
First, the Hanover Shoe rationale that a violation is complete at
the time of the first injury, while valid when dealing with the defen-
sive use of pass-on, fails to take into consideration what subse-
quently happens to the overcharge.' 3 In addition, the Illinois Brick
Court's interpretation of Hanover Shoe does not square with the
modern, liberalized approach to standing that has been adopted in
antitrust litigation." In fact, commentators in the field have almost
the law allows. At whatever price the buyer sells, the price he pays the seller remains
illegally high, and his profits would be greater were his costs lower.
Id.
40. Id. at 492-93.
41. Id. at 493.
42. Id. at 494.
43. For example, in Illinois Brick, the illegal overcharge could have led to a nine million
dollar recovery by the respondents if they had won. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
See also The Effect of Hanover Shoe, supra note 35, at 106.
44. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
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unanimously concluded that, notwithstanding a literal reading of
Hanover Shoe, section 4 of the Clayton Act should be construed to
allow indirect purchasers a chance to recover damages upon a show-
ing that the illegal overcharge was passed on to them."6
Second, the complexity of the proof involved would be no greater
for the indirect purchaser seeking to prove the pass-on than it is for
the direct purchaser proving the original overcharge."6 Nevertheless,
the Illinois Brick Court placed great weight on this factor in reach-
ing its decision. 7 In effect, the Court exalted one reason, difficulty
of proof, over two seemingly more important considerations under-
lying the policy behind the antitrust laws, compensation of the vic-
tims and deterrence of antitrust violations." Recovery should not be
defeated merely because proof of injury has been made difficult."
Third, emphasis in Hanover Shoe on effective private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws will be severely undermined by the
Court's decision in Illinois Brick.10 For a variety of reasons, the
direct purchaser may be unwilling or unable to pursue a treble-
damage action against the antitrust violator.51 Furthermore, the
45. See, e.g., The Offensive Use of Passing-On, supra note 35; Misuse of Hanover Doc-
trine, supra note 30; McGuire, supra note 30. But see Handler & Blechman, supra note 18,
at 638-55.
46. See Pollock, supra note 38, at 1210. See also Brief of Respondents at 29-30, Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In their brief, the respondents relied on Southern
Gen. Builders, Inc. v. Maule Indus., Inc., [1973] TRADE CAs. (CCH) 1 74,484 (S.D. Fla. 1972)
(indirect purchasers were able to prove their financial injury as a matter of fact), and Armco
Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967) (jury found that North Dakota had
suffered damages as a result of illegal overcharges on metal culverts for highways purchased
through general contractors), to show that the federal courts have been able to resolve the
factual issues bearing upon whether illegal overcharges were passed on to indirect purchasers.
47. 431 U.S. at 731-33.
48. See Brief for United States as amicus curiae at 15-21, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for United States].
49. 431 U.S. at 755-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946) (while a jury may not render a verdict based on speculation
or guesswork, even where the defendant has precluded a more concise computation of dam-
ages by his own wrong, the jury should make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage
based on relevant data, acting on probable and inferential as well as upon direct and positive
proof).
50. 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Some of the factors that may discourage potential plaintiffs from initiating antitrust
litigation are: (1) fear of undermining buyer-seller relationships; (2) fear of protracted litiga-
tion involving substantial expenditures of time, money, and effort; (3) fear of reprisals against
which the direct purchaser lacks effective remedy; (4) antipathy for the antitrust laws; or (5)
difficulties arising in proving an antitrust violation and the amount of damages from such a
violation. See Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALl. L. REv.
1319, 1330 (1973); The Effect of Hanover Shoe, supra note 35, at 112.
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Court's reference in Hanover Shoe to indirect purchasers did not
imply that they could not bring suit, but merely that they would be
unlikely to bring suit because of the inconsequential amount of
damages that they, as individuals, had suffered. 5 As a result of the
Court's rejection of the offensive use of the pass-on theory in Illinois
Brick, the direct purchasers, who have little incentive to sue where
the illegal overcharges can be passed to subsequent buyers, are
given standing to sue the antitrust violator, while the injured con-
sumers, who usually bear the brunt of the violations, are denied
access to the courts." The decision by the Court in Illinois Brick,
therefore, will severely undermine the effective enforcement of the
antitrust laws in the future.
THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLE LIABILITY
In rejecting the offensive use of the pass-on theory, the Court in
Illinois Brick also raised the spectre of multiple liability." The
Court's fears of multiple recoveries caused by procedural difficulties
or management problems in class action suits should not warrant
the complete denial of relief to an injured consumer. Where direct
and indirect purchasers bring suit in the same court, it is a simple
matter to consolidate the cases and to apportion damages on the
basis of each plaintiff's proven injuries.55
Therefore, the possibility of multiple liability arises in only two
situations: where pending suits by direct and indirect purchasers
are in different courts, or where additional suits based on the same
violation are filed after a full recovery has already been awarded in
the prior suit." In the first situation, the danger of multiple liability
can be minimized, if not entirely eliminated, by using procedural
devices which will consolidate the separate actions, 7 such as: (1) use
52. See Misuse of Hanover Doctrine, supra note 30, at 409.
53. 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. 431 U.S. at 730. See notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text supra.
55. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 42(a). The feasibility of apportioning damages among many
plaintiffs has been demonstrated in the antibiotic cases. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.) (passing-on theory could be employed where it was not used as a
defense and where wholesalers and retailers sold, in virtually all cases, at cost plus set
percentage mark-up), cert. denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S.
871 (1971).
56. See Brief for United States, supra note 48, at 25.
57. 1 Pr. 2 MooRE's FEDEAi.L PRACTCE Pt. 1, §§ 5.20- .40 (2d ed. 1977).
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of the interdistrict transfer power," (2) coordination of pretrial pro-
ceedings of cases pending in different districts, (3) transfer of cases
to a single district," and (4) transfer of cases by the Judicial Panel
of Multidistrict Litigation."
Another procedural device that could be effectively used is inter-
pleader, whereby defendants can bring all claimants into a single
forum and require them to litigate inter se to determine which party
is entitled to whatever damages might be recovered.6" Since rule
interpleader 2 limits the reach of a district court's service of process
to the territorial limits of the state in which it sits, the statutory
interpleader,13 with nationwide service of process, should be used.
The majority asserted that statutory interpleader would be an im-
practical alternative because it requires the defendant to post bond
for the amount in dispute, which he may be unwilling to do in light
of the huge amounts normally claimed in multiple-party treble-
damage actions.6" However, this argument overlooks the fact that
the amount of such a bond is dependent upon the discretion of the
court and could be set low enough to encourage defendants to invoke
its use in potential multiple-party antitrust suits."6 Thus, under the
statutory interpleader procedure, the problem of multiple recoveries
would be eliminated because all possible claimants would share in
any recovery."
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (1970).
59. Id. § 1404(a).
60. Id. § 1407. After pretrial transfers by the Panel under this section, cases can be
consolidated and transferred to the same district for trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
For a more extensive discussion of this process, see Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct
of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HAMv. L. Rzv. 1001 (1974); Comment, The Experience of
Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 39 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 588 (1972).
61. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF Tma LAW OF FEDERAL CourS § 74, at 362 (3d ed. 1976).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 22 provides in pertinent part: "(1) Persons having claims against the
plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such
that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability."
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970) provides in part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of inter-
pleader . . . if (1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship, . . . are
claiming or may claim to be entitled to . . . [the amount in question]; . . . and if
(2) the plaintiff has deposited such money or property or has paid the amount...
into the registry of the court. . . in such amount and with such surety as the court or
judge may deem proper ....
64. 431 U.S. at 738 n.20.
65. See note 63 supra.
66. For a discussion supporting the use of statutory interpleader, see The Effect of Hano-
ver Shoe, supra note 35, at 116-17. But see McGuire, supra note 30, at 197-98 (discussing other
circumstances in which statutory interpleader may be "impractical").
Vol. 16: 841
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Even though additional suits based on the same violation could
be filed after a full recovery has already been awarded in a prior suit,
the prospects of multiple liability are remote. 7 The protracted na-
ture of antitrust litigation, combined with the short, four-year stat-
ute of limitations," makes it unlikely that direct purchasers will
recover before indirect purchasers bring their own action. In addi-
tion to the short statute of limitations, the procedures for interven-
tion" or compulsory joinder of parties0 can be invoked to further
erode the possibility of multiple recoveries. 71 Finally, the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel may be available to the courts
in certain circumstances as possible solutions to the multiple liabil-
ity problem.72
IMPACT OF ILLINOIS BRICK
The broad language of section 4 of the Clayton Act extends to
"[any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . ., How-
ever, it is apparent that the Court's decision in Illinois Brick, deny-
ing indirect purchasers a chance to prove that they have been in-
jured by an antitrust violation, is a regrettable retreat from its ear-
lier decisions interpreting section 4 more broadly.7' Furthermore,
the majority's opinion clearly flies in the face of congressional pur-
pose in enacting the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act75 to give ultimate consumers an effective forum in which to
bring their claims for antitrust violations." Indeed, in adopting this
67. See Brief for United States, supra note 48, at 26-28.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970). The statute provides in pertinent part: "Any action to enforce
any cause of action under sections 15 or 15a of this title shall be forever barred unless
commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued."
69. FE6. R. Civ. P. 24.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
71. For a discussion advocating the use of the procedural devices of intervention and
compulsory joinder, see McGuire, supra note 30, at 197-202.
72. See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974). For a contrary view on the use of res judicata and collateral estoppel as
remedial devices, see Handler & Blechman, supra note 18, at 649-50.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (emphasis added).
74. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (19568) ("preferential
routing" agreements were declared unlawful as unreasonable restraints of trade under § 1 of
the Sherman Act).
75. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
76. See 431 U.S. at 764 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While the Antitrust Improvements
Act had not been enacted at the time this treble-damage action was commenced, it provided
1977-78
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 16: 841
legislation authorizing state attorneys general to sue parens patriae
on behalf of citizens of their various states, Congress acted on the
premise that section 4 did give a cause of action to indirect purchas-
ers.77 Although Illinois Brick may be construed to prevent indirect
purchasers from recovering, it is still too early to foresee the possible
ramifications of the Court's decision, not only on the enforcement
of the Antitrust Improvements Act, but also on the effective private
enforcement of antitrust laws in general.
CONCLUSION
With its narrow interpretation of Hanover Shoe, the Illinois Brick
Court departs from the Court's prior policy of giving the antitrust
laws a broad reading to insure their effective enforcement, moving
instead to one that will severely undermine such enforcement. As a
result of the Court's decision in Illinois Brick, Congress may once
again be forced to take action by enacting yet another statute, this
time expressly allowing indirect purchasers to bring a private treble-
damage action against an antitrust violator.78
Carl S. Hisiro
an excellent means for determining congressional intent when the case reached the Supreme
Court.
77. Id. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Rep. Rodino, a sponsor of the Act, stated during
the House debates:
[Alssuming the State attorney general proves a violation, and proves that an over-
charge was "passed on" to the consumers, injuring them "in their property"; that is,
their pocketbooks-recoveries are authorized by the compromise bill whether or not
the consumers purchased directly from the price fixer, or indirectly, from intermedi-
aries, retailers, or middlemen.
122 CONG. Rsc. H10,295 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976). Congress accepted the holding of the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th
Cir. 1973) (ultimate consumers had standing to bring an action to recover on the theory that
unlawful prices charged to consumers' contractors pursuant to suppliers' conspiracy to fix
prices were passed on to consumers by contractors), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974), as
correctly stating the law in the area at the time. See S. Rap. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
42-43 (1976).
78. As Justice Blackmun so cogently stated in Illinois Brick: "One regrets that it takes
so long and so much repetitious effort to achieve, and have this Court recognize, the obvious
congressional aim." 431 U.S. at 766 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
